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Abstract 
The problem of mysterianism can be considered from two perspectives. The first is the attitude 
to the question of determinability of the mystery or the issue of consciousness that can be 
called the mysterian dispute. The second issue is the formulation of the problem itself, which 
can be called the limitation theorem. In the paper the author describes from the second point 
of view and concludes that problem of mysterianism is based on equivocation. On the one 
hand, the explanation is sometimes understood as a complete solution to the problem (as when 
one can present a correct proof of a theorem), on the other, as acceptable and satisfying the 
conditions of a well-formed theory. There is no one and definite explaining theory – In the 
sense that the classic ideal of science, which is based on the architectural model of knowledge, 
gives to the term definitive explanation. At the same time, there are many explanatory con-
cepts, empirical hypotheses, and speculations that explain mental phenomena. 
Keywords: mysterianism; limits of knowledge; philosophy of mind, Brentano’s thesis; limi-
tation theorem 
 
1. Introduction: What is it like to be a mysterian? 
 In The Science of the Mind, Owen Flanagan uses the term mysterianism to describe the beliefs 
of those thinkers who consider the problem of consciousness cannot be solved by the means 
available to modern science or by empirical methods. Flanagan distinguishes between two 
types of mysterianism, an old one and a new one. The modern rationalists, such as Descartes, 
Leibniz, and Huxley are the old mysterians. The precursor of the new mysterian movement is 
supposedly Thomas Nagel with his famous article What is it like to be a bat? (Nagel, 1979; 
Flanagan, 1991; 313; 314). Both types have one feature in common, they claim that the me-





does not necessarily mean that there is no solution to the problem of consciousness or the 
famous body-mind problem (although many of them used to claim that). It means only that 
this solution, according to mysterians, cannot be elaborated upon by empirical methods.  
The notion “mysterianism” is picked up by Daniel Dennett. In Sweet Dreams he builds an 
opposition between the reactionary philosophers who "surround consciousness with adoration 
as a secret slipping away from science," and researchers who "can explain what consciousness 
is as deeply and completely as other natural phenomena: metabolism, reproduction, continen-
tal drift, light, gravity, etc." (Dennett, 2005, p. 61). 
The author of The Science of the Mind maintains that the mysterian standpoint is neither pre-
posterous nor incoherent, but, in his opinion, it is an unsuccessful attempt to apply similar 
limitative theorems known to science as Heiselberg's Uncertainty Principle and Gödel Incom-
pleteness Theorem in the philosophy of mind (Flanagan, 1991, p. 314). Flanagan believes 
however that “[a]s a result of some recent work in neuropsychology, cognitive science, and 
philosophy we have, I think , the beginnings of a unified theory of consciousness…” (Flana-
gan, 1991, p. 314). 
The limitations of knowledge have always aroused emotions. Not only when it comes to the 
problem of justifying specific empirical theories, but this was especially true when it concerns 
conscious human beings. Unraveling the mystery of the mind and consciousness comes to be 
the dispute between the supporters of the view that a satisfactory description of the functioning 
of the mind is entirely achievable by the means available to modern science and the so-called 
mysterians who claim that it is beyond our ability. Dennett’s opposition appeals to the diffe-
rence between problem and mystery made by Noam Chomsky in his Reflections on Language, 
where he stated that the “problem appears to be within the reach of approaches and concepts 
that are moderately well understood” but mysteries “remain as obscure to us today as 
when they were originally formulated” (Chomsky, 1998, p. 137). Chomsky mentions here 
some examples of mysteries, namely, causation of behavior, creative aspect of language use 
and problem of other minds (Chomsky, 1998, p. 139). According to him, we can formulate 
scientific questions but rather fail while grappling with them, as in the case of mysteries. 
Colin McGinn distinguishes between problems that are “questions that fall within our cogni-
tive bounds”, mysteries that are questions “that do not differ from a problem in point of the 
naturalness of its subject-matter, but only in respect of the contingent cognitive capacities that 
certain beings possess: the mystery is a mystery for that being” illusions which is a pseudo-
question that “suggest an answer of a kind that does not objectively exist” and issues which 
are a question, typically of a normative character” (McGinn, 1993, p. 3).  
 According to Chomsky and McGinn, mystery seems to be something in between well-formu-
lated scientific problems and paradox. On the one hand, it can be formulated as a meaningful, 
understandable scientific question, but on the other, we will never be able to answer them, 
although there is no contradiction in them. There are for sure many examples of it in the scien-
ces: What are two natural numbers that will never be added by humans? What had happened 
when the first Cro-Magnon human being met Neanderthals for the very first time in the history 
of the Planet? One can freely give other examples of such mysteries in science. What could be 
interesting here is the question if there are any crucial and important mysteries. I think that 
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answer is in the negative. Although there are mysteries in science there is no general limitative 
theorem about mind among them, because it simply does not meet conditions of a well-for-
mulated scientific problem.  
This dispute about limitations in science of the mind is based on a fundamental misunderstan-
ding. The participants of the dispute assume that we can unambiguously and in indisputable 
terms formulate the initial problem and what is even more important is that we do have a single 
and unambiguous method of solving such problems. I think both assumptions are false.  
Mysterianism covers at least four areas of issue: body-mind problems, the question of natura-
lization of intentions, reduction problems, and questions related to biological explanations. 
Some are inclined to add to this list the problem of free will (cf. De Caro, 2009, p. 450) and as 
a separate issue the question of first-person cognition and the sufficiency of conceptual means 
at the disposal of today's science (Nagel, 2013, p. 16).  
It is difficult to highlight a single dominant problem thread. An important distinction between 
these ontological, epistemological, and methodological issues also affects the list. The limita-
tion may relate to knowing what the relationships between mental and physical properties (on-
tological level) are, whether the cognitive system can represent these relationships (epistemic 
level), and the interrelationships between the theories of different levels and possible reduction 
of one group of theories to another (methodological level). Moreover, some standpoints – such 
as the famous Donald Davidson's anomalous monism – concern both the body-mind problem 
and issues related to reduction. While operating on the ontological level (mental events vs. 
physical events) Davidson denies on the methodological level the existence of bridge laws 
reducing or translating mental events into physical events (Davidson, 1980, p. 212). 
Yet, multiple complications do not prove the impossibility of raising one general limitation 
problem. They merely indicate that it would be extremely difficult to do so. To overcome this 
difficulty, we need a particular method that would enable work on what the mentioned issues 
have in common. As far as I know, such a method does not exist. 
There are specific problems regarding explanatory gap, reduction, supervenience, or emer-
gentism (cf. Kim, 2008, p. 118; Poczobut, 2009, p. 137; Fodor, 1981, p. 131). We do not know 
exactly how to translate them into the body-mind problem (Kim 1993, p. 89). Still, there is no 
way to address all the issues. Moreover, as Ernest Nagel points out, to make reductions the 
existence of complete and finished theories is necessary, but such a theory has not yet been 
achieved (Nagel, 1961, p. 337). The problem, therefore, seems too complicated to be posed in 
the form of one general dilemma. 
Although mysterianism can be considered (by mysterians themselves as well as their oppo-
nents) to be a limitative opinion according to which: 
a) there are persistent philosophical problems and their solution lies beyond the limits of 
human cognition, 
b) these problems include the issue of the complete explanation of the mind, 
c) it is possible to state proof of the complete explanation of the problem of the mind, and 





The difficulty lies in formulating the limitative thesis that covers all the indicated problems, 
grasping what they have in common. It seems impossible. Mysterianism forms a complex of 
opinions rather than one standpoint, so there can be no general formulation of the mystery.  
 
2. What is the dispute about? 
The problem of mysterianism can be considered from two perspectives. The first is the formu-
lation of the problem itself, which I call a limitation theorem perspective. The second is a for-
mulation of the question regarding explanation possibility of consciousness and mind within 
the scientific framework. I will call it a mysterian dispute perspective. 
Taking limitation theorem perspective, one must notice that many mysterians formulate limi-
tation theorem in many different ways and using many different concepts. Just to give some 
examples of such formulations:  
a) Consciousness cannot be completely explained (Flanagan, 1993, p. 313), 
b) The notion of mind cannot be naturalized (Seager, 2000; 106; 2013, p. 184), 
c) The scope and nature of explanations available to people are limited (Chomsky, 2013, 
p. 664), 
d) The phenomenon of consciousness cannot be explained in terms of currently prevailing 
scientific orthodoxy (Nagel, 2012, p. 42). 
If one examines this modest choice of formulations – one can easily notice that the relation-
ships between them are not always logical – defining the logical value of any statement does 
not always involve the indication of the value of another. If we assume, for example, that 
sentence ‘c’ is true, then its truth will not tell us anything about the logical value of the other 
statements. The dispute as to whether the problem of the mind and consciousness can be com-
pletely solved or not can continue even after we have determined (solely as an example) that 
the notion of mind cannot be naturalized. In turn, the fact that the scope and nature of expla-
nations available to people are limited does not mean that consciousness cannot be completely 
explained. It shows that there is no single, strict formulation of mysterian standpoint, not to 
mention the limitative theorem. 
From the perspective of the dispute, mysterianism is a spectrum of questions and argumenta-
tions regarding limitative hypotheses and the possibility of the complete empirical explanation 
of the mind. Arguments usually are trying to support one of the above-mentioned formulations. 
Questions are applying a wide range of many different concepts that situate the problem in 
many different paradigms and frameworks. Here are some examples of the main formulations: 
• “How can living physical bodies in the physical world produce such phenomena [as con-
sciousness – W.M.]? Is it possible to explain the problem of consciousness in terms of 
natural sciences?” (Dennett, 1992, p. 25). 
• “Is it possible to predict certain properties of the mental level n based on the knowledge of 
the laws and properties of level n -1?” (E. Nagel; 1961, p. 319). 
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• “The issue is whether there can be a general notion of experience that extends far beyond 
our own or anything like it” (T. Nagel, 1986, p. 21).  
• “Is it possible to naturalize the notion of mind without referring to mentalistic notions?” 
(Seager, 2000, p.107) . 
• “How do phenomenological properties "originate", "derive", "emerge" from physical pro-
perties?” (DeCaro, 2009, p. 450). 
• “Are there any strict psychophysical laws that enable us to indicate causal relationships 
between mental and physical events?” (Davidson, 2005, p. 192). 
• “How do conscious states depend on brain states?” (McGinn, 1994, p. 100). 
• “How are the characteristics of a given (mental – W.M.) level related to those of neigh-
boring levels (e.g., chemical or biological – W.M.)?” (Kim, 1993, p. 16). 
• “How can we explain the causation of human behavior?” (Chomsky, 1998, p. 138). 
Some of the terms used above relate to the famous body-mind problem, others focus rather on 
intertheoretical reduction problems. It is also clear that they use very different notions that can 
be introduced with some further difficult questions such as: would the indication that there are 
no strict psychophysical laws mean that it is impossible to explain the problem of conscious-
ness in terms of the natural sciences (e.g. neuroscience)?  
Is it possible to translate the terms of one question into the terms of the other? Are phenome-
nological properties mentioned by DeCaro the same as Davidson’s mental events? Is it po-
ssible to reduce or translate one theory or model into the other – e.g., to determine how phe-
nomenal qualities relate to physical events? The possibility of multiplying such issues and 
doubts suggests that the answer to any of these questions does not resolve the mysterian prob-
lem. Supposing that Daniel Dennett is right and his question about the possibility of explaining 
the problem of consciousness in terms of natural sciences finds a positive answer, does not 
mean yet that there are any strict psychophysical laws that enable us to indicate causal rela-
tionships between mental and physical events (as in Davidson’s question). Answering one of 
these questions would not close the dispute. There is no mystery of consciousness and 
mind because it cannot be unambiguously and generally formulated either in a question or in 
a single thesis.  
 
3. About three arguments in a dispute 
This thesis is confirmed by the mysterians' argumentative practice itself. They use very diffe-
rent types of arguments and these arguments – if they are acknowledged – present different 
standpoints. I will discuss three of them here: evolutionary, modulary and transcendental. 
Noam Chomsky, reflecting upon What can we understand (2012), claims that what is called 
mysterianism is trivial. In his opinion, both Locke and Hume were mysterians, as well as Des-
cartes – who “suggests that we may not have intelligence enough to discover the nature of 
mind” (Chomsky, 1988, p. 140). Though for some other reasons, anyone who considers the 





ganism (and body system) has cognitive limitations (is limited in its functions) and because 
a human being is an organism, it must be concluded that a human being has cognitive limita-
tions too. After all, the cognitive apparatus was shaped in the finite time of evolution for spe-
cific environmental tasks that our ancestors struggled with. "If we are biological organisms, 
not angels – Chomsky writes – then our cognitive faculties are similar to those called physical 
capacities and should be studied much as other systems of the body” (Chomsky, 2012, p. 664). 
What Chomsky proves is only the existence of some cognitive limitations resulting from the 
development of organisms. However, this argument does not prove at all that full knowledge 
of the mind is beyond human reach and, even if it is today, that it will always remain an evo-
lutionary mystery.  
Colin McGinn begins his argumentation with a similar strategy when he writes "for the same 
reason that we make so little progress in unassisted flying – that is, we lack the requisite equip-
ment. We have gaps in our cognitive skills as we have gaps in our motor skills – though in 
both cases we can see what we are missing and feel the resulting frustrations” (McGinn, 
1993, p. 13). 
There is weak point in evolutionary argumentation. Amoeba cannot see colors, a dog cannot 
do multiplication and a chimpanzee does not know how to extract root. They simply do not 
know that they are unable to do this. However, humans, in contrast to other organisms are 
aware of their ignorance. We can at least indicate what we do not know, and according to the 
mysterians we can even present proof that we would never know. So, the analogy between 
human and other organisms’ ignorance seems to be weak.  
In order to avoid this weakness McGinn's argumentation appeals to Russell's distinction be-
tween knowledge by acquaintance and conceptual knowledge (Russell, 1910). McGinn points 
out that our knowledge of consciousness comes from direct experience, which cannot be ex-
pressed by any theoretical terms: We know what consciousness is only by acquaintance, but 
this knowledge by acquaintance can be hardly transferred into conceptual knowledge. “If this 
is correct, then we can say two things: first, that this knowledge is enough to ground our sense 
that there is a mind-body problem; and second, that it explains why we feel that our sense of 
the problem outstrips our ability to articulate because its articulation would transfer it from the 
sphere of knowledge by an acquaintance to conceptual knowledge, where it does not originally 
belong” (McGinn, 2004, p. 9). It is a bit like wanting to play Gödel's proof on the piano.  
In this respect dog and chimpanzee do know that there are a certain number of given things 
(for example members of their pack) by acquaintance, but they have no concept of the number. 
According to McGinn we can represent the objects in the world (in some cases perhaps better 
than other vertebrates) but we are rather unable to represent how our representation works. 
Scientific description covers a wide range of problems but unfortunately not all of them – there 
are some mysteries about our representation capacities that involve the question about con-
sciousness, body-mind, a priori, self, and knowledge. All of them seem to be aspects of the 
main mystery of how our mind represents the world. What enables us to be aware of it? 
McGinn formulates the conditions of limitation theorem in terms of his transcendental natu-
ralism (TN): “According to TN about a certain question Q with respect to a being B, the sub-
ject-matter of Q has three properties: (i) reality, (ii) naturalness and (iii) epistemic 
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inaccessibility to B. Q does not harbor an illusion (hence (i)), nor does it refer to entities or 
properties that are intrinsically non-natural (hence (ii)), yet the answer to Q is beyond the 
capacities of B creatures (hence (iii))” (McGinn, 1993, p. 4). 
One can formulate the general limitative theorem only if one adopts strong realism, and natu-
ralism. Besides this, there is a further assumption required to follow McGinn’s mysterianism: 
modular theory of mind which claims that every single cognitive function is either the product 
of a module or complex of modules. We do not have a module to solve the problem of mind, 
we can only know it by acquaintance. That is why the mystery appears.  
I venture to suggest that these assumptions are very strong, not obvious and simply cannot be 
acknowledged as general. The modular theory of mind applied by McGinn is also very vague. 
Diana Inez Perez notices that it is not obvious that the modular architecture of the mind entails 
this kind of mysterianism and McGinn hardly characterizes the modules of mind (Perez, 2005, 
p. 46). In my opinion, there is a basic failure in McGinn’s representation of our understanding 
of the world. McGinn uses terms like ‘human’ or ‘species’ in an evolutionary sense. He un-
derstands the human being as a limited animal because of evolution. Perhaps we can solve 
more mathematical problems than chimpanzees but still, many problems remain mysteries for 
us. But this model works in a shorter perspective of time too. McGinn would have to agree 
that human beings in the twenty-first century are different from medieval people because we 
can solve many more problems (in mathematics and physics) and we are aware of many more 
issues. But it is an absurd from the point of view of evolution. 
The transcendental argument is the most frequently presented. Flanagan (Flanagan, 
1991, p. 62), followed by Michael Gazzaniga (Gazzaniga, 2018, p. 18), calls it Brentano's the-
sis. I will call it transcendental because it is based on the belief that mind is (as in Kant's 
philosophy) the elementary condition of the possibility of knowledge about anything (inclu-
ding itself).  
William Seager has recently invoked this argument. He calls it Plato's problem, the paradox 
of consciousness, or methodological mysterianism (Seager, 2000; Seager, 2012). Accor-
ding to him, the argument is based on the belief that any explanation or theory significantly 
contains or implies intentional terms. Seager starts by imposing the following conditions 
on naturalization: 
(1) X has been explained in terms of Something Else. 
(2) The Something Else does not essentially involve X. 
(3) The Something Else is properly natural” (Seager, 2000, p. 96 cf. 2013, p. 151). 
According to Seager, fulfilling these conditions of naturalization is impossible in the case of 
mind. If we assume that the set of intentional terms X is explained by a set of terms SE (some-
thing else), then, even if we assume that SE does not contain any terms from the set X, the 
very notion of explaining can be understood only intentionally. “It is possible – Seager writes 
– that those are the conditions of naturalization that block naturalization. I take this to be so 
— Rule 2 cannot be satisfied in the case of mind (intentionality, meaning, content, etc.) since 
a variety of mentalistic notions must be understood for any explanation to be given” (Seager, 





Every explanation uses primary notions and rules and their assumption is essential to present 
a given explanation. The very notion of explanation can be reduced to mental notions only (the 
category of the intellect for Kant), which cannot be further explained, but can only be tran-
scendentally deduced, based on the knowledge we possess. 
In another book, Natural Fabrications – Seager calls this situation a paradox. He uses the 
notion of mentally dependent features – i.e. higher-level features (they are such features as 
being money or consciousness). The notion of consciousness seems to be so ungrateful that it 
must be assumed – according to Seager at every level of explanation: “the conscious deploy-
ment of an explanatory system is one more high-level feature which itself is a mere epistemic 
potentiality unless it is taken up into a further consciously deployed explanatory system. This 
seems to be a vicious regress that leaves consciousness as nothing but merely potential, never 
'actualized'. Each standpoint, as a high-level feature, requires a conscious appreciation of it to 
transcend mere potentiality, but if consciousness itself is a high-level feature then each con-
sciousness requires a further consciousness to appreciate it” (Seager, 2012, p. 184). 
 
4. Metamysterianism – why we cannot formulate the general problem of consciousness 
If I am right, then the mysterian discussion revolving around a whole series of issues covered 
by the common slogan of the mystery of mind resembles a plot, which unfortunately Hans Ch. 
Andersen did not follow in the famous fairy tale about the emperor's new clothes. This plot is 
a dispute between those who praise the new outfit and those who believe that showing up in 
such a colorful garment is inappropriate for the head of state. Both parties can hardly see that 
the emperor is naked and their problem cannot be formulated.  
At first sight, the claim that it is impossible to indicate a general limitative thesis must seem 
absurd. There is nothing as simple as articulating the problem. Here it is: the mystery of con-
sciousness cannot be completely solved. In fact, the limitative issue can be indicated with the 
help of this and other expressions, but it will not be an unambiguous and general problem.  
Why? It would be necessary to define the concept of complete solution and define when we 
can have a complete solution. When attempting to define it, we will fall into futile disputes. 
The concept of complete solution (applied by Daniel Dennett in Sweet Dreams) has a different 
meaning for mysterians and critics of mysterianism. For antimysterians the complete solution 
is a situation in which consciousness and mind will be defined as one of empirical problems 
of science. It does not have to be completely explained and it does not require completed 
knowledge about it. It is enough when the method of dealing with a problem is completed and 
when we can say that we have a physical or biological framework of experimenting, describing 
and predicting the phenomena concerned with mind and consciousness. Complete solution of 
a problem means here complete method for solving a problem.  
Mysterians seem to understand complete solution in a very different way. They require a single 
theory that would explain everything about mental phenomena. This one single theory would 
be a complete solution according to them. For one of them the complete solution means a well-
formed method of explaining and for the other a final explanation.  
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This  equivocation however,  leads  to the  false  dilemma. Which of  the problems  of  natural 
science have been solved completely? Is it possible to solve problems completely outside de-
ductive theories? For these difficulties, it is impossible to formulate the limitative problem 
in the theory of mind in an unambiguous and general way. 
The problem can only be formulated using certain notions and a specific language. Therefore, 
for each formula that would potentially formulate a problem, it should be proven that its no-
tions and language are translatable into other formulas or that there are other candidates for 
formulating the elementary limitative theorem.  
Of course, these requirements must be laid down in advance, several regulatory definitions 
must be introduced, because psychological, mental, or intentional features create a class of 
dramatically inaccurate notions. Any such definition would become a separate problem, the 
basic one being the issue of arbitrariness in defining vague terms. The reduction of any term 
belonging to a natural language may prove impossible for quite trivial reasons – the terms of 
natural languages are vague and their reliable use usually requires clarifications and so-called 
regulatory definitions (Ajdukiewicz, 1975, p. 77). 
This, in my opinion, applies to such terms as mind or consciousness, but I will use a simpler 
example. Let us consider two terms: maturity and old age. They are not foreign to such scien-
ces as biology or medicine – they develop a whole range of theories related to the process of 
aging – from the concept of free radicals, through the hypothesis of a genetic or accidental 
aging process, to the indication of aging biomarkers such as the frailty index. Any explanation 
of the term old age will be arbitrary due to its vagueness – it will omit some features and some 
individuals that we would like to deem old. A common sign of aging is muscle and bone 
weakness which accompanies a certain age of an individual of a certain species. Thus, instead 
of one problem, we end up with two: the arbitrary determination of the age at which the weak-
ness is to occur and the arbitrary determination of the term weakness itself. Therefore, perhaps 
it is the simplest feature of the natural language which eliminates the possibility of the general 
limitative thesis. 
The history of struggling with the topic suggests that these difficulties are extremely hard to 
overcome. In addition to vagueness and arbitrary choice of notions, there is one more im-
portant reason why it is impossible to formulate the general problem. Questions may turn out 
to be false dilemmas. False dilemmas can show spectrum extremes, chosen elements of a nu-
merous collection, which may not necessarily be opposites. Such questions as Are mental fea-
tures reduced to physical features? remain unanswered for a simple reason – they require 
several clarifications. For example, mental features may be defined in various ways therefore 
the answers will be different depending on the initial definition. Thus, it may happen that we 
will have two good theories, one of which will answer similar questions in the affirmative, the 









5. Conclusion: Why is there no limitative theorem in the philosophy of mind? 
The problem of mysterianism is based on equivocation. On the one hand, possible explanations 
are understood as a complete solution to the problem. On the other, to reveal the mystery is to 
have one single and coherent theory that could explain everything about mind and conscious-
ness. Antimysterians are satisfied with many competitive empirical explanations, while mys-
terians try to prove that a single coherent empirical explanation is not possible. Although both 
understand the complete solution in a very different way, both seem to assume the existence 
of a basic theory as it was in the classical ideal of science.  
According to the classical ideal, science is a hierarchically structured system. There is a set of 
basic concepts, items or entities, and they are combined through primary relationships. In 
a history of philosophy from Plato to Kant metaphysics was acknowledged as a fundamental 
and basic theory. In the nineteenth century it was formal logic, and at the beginning of the 
twentieth century Edmund Husserl introduced the idea of phenomenology. In the middle of 
the past century, physics was claimed to be a fundamental science.  
In the classical ideal of science this fundamental theory is necessary for any further explana-
tions and all possible science is a kind of extension, specification or application of this basic 
theory. For antimysterians the basic theory is a galaxy of empirical methods with neuroscience 
grounded in physics at the centre – every explanation is good as far as it applies measurements, 
observation and some mathematics. In such a framework every phenomenon, including mind 
and consciousness, not only can but must be explained by the means of current science. 
Mysterians claim that an empirical framework cannot be applied to mind and consciousness, 
but they still appeal to the classical ideal of science – it can be the general theory of evolution 
(as in Chomsky’s argumentation), modular theory of mind (as in Mc Ginn’s work) or metho-
dology (as in transcendental argumentation). Both parties assume the existence of basic pri-
vileged theory.  
But the existence of such a basic explanation is doubtful or better to say it is a very strong and 
radical assumption. There are for sure many explanatory concepts, empirical hypotheses, and 
speculations that explain mental phenomena. Examples may include the concept of cerebral 
cortex development under the Baldwin effect or statistical models of propagation of neural 
signals. There are attempts to explain how mind and consciousness work that give us an in-
creasingly close look at the neural fundaments of perception and cognition. However, there is 
still no one single theory. Therefore, the mysterian dispute is pointless. Mysterians seem to 
expect a spectacular final proof which ends the mind-related discussion. Whereas their oppo-
nents seem to claim that it is possible to build many models explaining how the mind (or 
selected cognitive functions) works without propounding metaphysical notions and the mere 
fact that we have such theories sufficiently proves the falsehood of mysterianism.  
Both are mistaken. The general presupposition of the dispute is the existence of the elementary 
theory, and then the existence of the elementary problem which could only be developed in 
such a theory. However, the existence of such a theory is the legacy of the classical ideal of 
science. It is not clear what such a theory would be: universal mathematics, protological cal-
culus, physics, quantum physics, or phenomenology? 
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Solvable or not, the global and general mystery of mind simply cannot be formulated, although 
it can be pointed out in natural language. This, in turn, lets us believe that it does not exist at 
all, that it is magic, lost in many stories' philosophical stone. 
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